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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 900560 CA 
FOSTER LEONARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction of 
the appellant on charges of possession of equipment with the 
intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony; and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court on 
the 22nd day of June, 1990. 
2. On or about July 20, 1989, the appellant, in the company 
of April Garza who is also a defendant and appellant, and his 
automobile were searched and items were seized by law enforcement 
officers without the assistance of a search warrant. The 
appellant and April Garza were arrested and taken to the 
headquarters of the American Fork Police Department for 
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interrogation. 
3. As a result of the said search of the appellant's 
automobile, and based upon brief information given to the law 
enforcement officers, a search warrant was obtained for the 
search of the residence occupied by the appellant and April 
Garza. 
4. The search was conducted on April 20, 1989, and items of 
evidence were seized which were used at the preliminary hearing, 
and which were to be used against him at trial. 
5. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized at the time of the stop of his automobile and pursuant to 
the search warrant. A hearing was conducted by the in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable George E. Ballif, District 
Judge, on the 29th day of August, 1989. A transcript of the 
hearing is part of the record on appeal. The issues raised in 
the motion were: 
a) That the arrest of the appellant was unreasonable 
as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; 
b) That the warrantless search of the appellant's 
vehicle was unreasonable as not being based upon probable cause 
and not based upon a lawful arrest; 
c) That the search of the appellant's residence 
pursuant to the search warrant was unreasonable as the warrant 
was granted pursuant to inadequate information as contained in 
the affidavit. 
6. Judge Ballif, after hearing the evidence, allowed 
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counsel the opportunity to submit further memoranda and took the 
matter under advisement (T 149, L 9-10). Judge Ballif rendered 
his memorandum decision denying the motion to suppress evidence 
on October 19, 1989 (R 108-112) 
7. The appellant, pursuant to plea negotiations/ entered a 
plea of guilty to two third degree felonies reserving his right 
to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress 
evidence. The relevant facts that pertain to the argument on the 
issues will be set forth in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
8. Had the trial court granted the appellant's motion to 
suppress evidence/ the charges against him would likely have been 
dismissed for lack of evidence with which to prosecute. The 
issues before this Court/ therefore/ are: 
a) Whether the search of the appellant's vehicle 
without a warrant and with the information then available to the 
law enforcement officers was reasonable or unreasonable pursuant 
to the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court/ the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court. 
b) Whether the arrest of the appellant pursuant to the 
stopping of the appellant and the searching of his vehicle was 
lawful or unlawful pursuant to the appellant's Fourth Amendment 
rights as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court/ the 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court. 
c) Whether the custodial interrogation of the 
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appellant was lawful or unlawful pursuant to the appellant's 
Fifth Amendment rights as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court. 
d) Whether the search pursuant to a warrant conducted 
on the appellant's residence was reasonable or unreasonable 
pursuant to the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
9. The determinative Constitutional provisions are as 
follows: 
a) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America, to wit: 
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR 
PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS, AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SHALL NOT 
BE VIOLATED, AND NO WARRANTS SHALL ISSUE, BUT 
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE, SUPPORTED BY OATH OR 
AFFIRMATION, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE 
PLACE TO BE SEARCHED, AND THE PERSONS OR 
THINGS TO BE SEIZED. 
b) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America, to wit: 
NO PERSON SHALL . . . NOR SHALL BE COMPELLED 
IN ANY CRIMINAL CASE TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST 
HIMSELF . . . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
10. The arguments of the appellant are summarized as 
follows: 
a) The arrest of the appellant on the interstate 
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highway in the vicinity of American Fork, Utah County, Utah, was 
not based upon probable cause to satisfy a constitutional 
standard, and was unreasonable. 
b) The search of the appellant's vehicle subsequent to 
his arrest was not based upon probable cause to satisfy a 
constitutional standard, and was unreasonable. 
c) The interrogation of the appellant by law 
enforcement officers was tainted by the unlawful arrest of the 
appellant and the unlawful search of his vehicle, and was 
therefore given under duress in violation of constitutional law. 
d) The search of the appellant's residence pursuant to 
the search warrant was unreasonable because the affidavit which 
was prepared in support of the search warrant was insufficient on 
its face upon which to issue the warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS UNREASONABLE AS NOT 
HAVING BEEN BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE 
II. The same grounds that apply to the execution of a 
warrantless search of a vehicle also apply to the seizure of a 
person in the contest of an arrest. The facts which describe the 
reasons why the law enforcement officers stopped the appellant's 
vehicle are without anything but self-serving corroboration. The 
allegations of description of the appellant's clothing, his 
smoking, his standing in front of the doorway making suspicious 
glances outside, his withdrawing a wallet from his pants, the 
loading of the purchased items into the vehicle, his manner of 
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driving to include speeding and spinning tires (T-10, L-2 through 
T-19, L-25), are factual allegations that police officers make/ 
that courts believe and that defendants have no effective ability 
to controvert. The appellant did not give testimony at the 
suppression hearing/ and Judge Ballif accepted the assertions 
made in the testimony as fact. It is not unreasonable to 
remember that the law enforcement officer's purpose was to effect 
an arrest and make a search and to have it upheld. The appellant 
asserts that other facts were more reliable and more 
substantively operative than the alleged observations of the law 
enforcement officer, to wit: 
a) The law enforcement officer saw that glassware had 
been picked up as well as a chemical/ but he did not know what it 
was (T-32/ L-2Q through 22). He also explained that certain 
types of chemicals were regulated and certain were not and that 
he did not know what the chemicals were (T-32# L-23 through T-33f 
L-6). 
b) The law enforcement officer made a telephone call 
to the person in the place of business where the items were 
purchased to inquire whether the items just sold to the appellant 
and April Garza were "regulated/" but the call was made after 
the law enforcement officers had initiated their pursuit of the 
appellant (T-33f L-12 through T-34, L-6). 
c) Nothing the appellant and April Garza had purchased 
was illegal (T-34/ L-19 through T-35# L-3). 
12. The law enforcement officers had made the decision/ 
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regardless of any fact which should have encouraged them to do 
otherwise, to arrest the appellant and April Garza and to seize 
whatever they had purchased. The only legal basis for the arrest 
and search was based upon the law enforcement officer's 
description of the conduct of the appellant. 
13. None of the items possessed by the appellant were 
illegal nor did any even rise to the level of being regulated (T-
96, L-5 through 15). The law enforcement officer only saw boxes 
and did not know what was in them T-96, L-16 through 20). 
14. in order for the arrest of the appellant to be 
reasonable it must be based upon vague unsubstantiated suspicions 
voiced by an officer. State v. Ream, 505 P.2d 569 (Ariz. 1973) 
The officers cannot any more justification to their purpose than 
to arrest the next person out of the place of business that sold 
the items seized. The lack of a requirement on law enforcement 
to do more than self justify in effect encourages self 
justification. The Rodney King incident that has cause such 
turmoil in Los Angeles has cast some very reasonable doubts 
concerning the integrity of law enforcement officers once they 
have determined upon a purpose. Their purpose was early on 
determined, to wit: Although law enforcement officers did not 
know exactly what was in the appellant's possession, they 
determined to arrest him. Their pursuit was nothing more than an 
action which they hoped they could justify after the fact. 
15. A law enforcement officer, in order to stop a vehicle, 
must meet the standard of a reasonable suspicion which may be 
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intelligently articulated that a crime has been committed or is 
about to be committed. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 790, (Or. 1978). 
This Court has held that "any time a police officer stops an 
automobile the stop necessarily involves detention and therefore 
is an encounter requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion." 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). In State 
v. Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App. 1990) this Court 
has summarized recent developments of the law applicable to 
"reasonable suspicion" into three general principals: 
First, a reasonable suspicion must be based 
upon objective facts which indicate the 
existence of criminal activity. Second, the 
officer must be able to articulate what it is 
about those facts which leads to an inference 
of criminal activity. If the officer is 
unable to articulate what facts and 
inferences led to his suspicion, the 
suspicion is classified as a mere hunch and 
will not justify the subsequent stop. 
Finally the facts must be judged against an 
objective standard: would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search "warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches. 
(Citations omitted.) 
16. The place of business that sold these products was the 
object of surveillance by law enforcement. Although it was 
legally in the business of selling lawful products, each patron 
appeared to take on the shadow of suspicion merely by entering 
the front door. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based upon that. 
The act of smoking outside the premises seems to comply with 
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standards of courtesy not to mention the Utah Clean Air Act. 
Reasonable suspicion cannot be based upon that. The fact of 
reaching for a wallet to pay for merchandise is one of the most 
common acts involved in retail business that it cannot be 
considered the basis for reasonable suspicion. The appellant's 
looking down the street is not a suspicious act. 
17. The explanation of the officer regarding his 
interpretation of what he saw is a weak attempt at justification, 
and his alleged observations must be taken with an understanding 
that his motive was based upon his intent to make an arrest in 
this case. The objective standard against which the stop must be 
measured was the ascertainable nature of the merchandise, to wit: 
Nothing was illegal and nothing was "regulated." This law 
enforcement could have learned immediately as the appellant drove 
away. it learned the fact at the scene of the stop, arrest and 
search. The appellant was in possession of legal items which 
were legally sold. 
18. At the time of the arrest, the law enforcement officers 
had no evidence that a crime had been committed. Although the 
appellant possessed equipment and chemicals that could be used in 
the manufacture of methamphetamine, the possession of those 
items, as a fact standing alone, is not sufficient to prove that 
the crime of possession with the intention to manufacture 
controlled substances has been made out. It is well known in 
criminal law that presumptions cannot be employed by the 
prosecution as a means of relieving itself of the burden of 
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proof. Presumptions certainly cannot be used to shift the burden 
of proof to the accused. The law enforcement officers have 
attempted to employ both self serving statements as well as the 
results of their acts as a basis to justify their acts. The stop 
and the arrest must be justified prior to the stop and the 
arrest. The facts which are used to justify the stop and arrest 
can be successfully asserted against anyone. For this Court to 
allow the objective facts (the actual legal items) of the case to 
be ignored and to allow the subjective facts (the statements of 
the law enforcement officers) concerning the appellant's conduct 
to serve as the legally recognized justification for the search 
is to virtually eliminate the need for any police officer to 
articulate any justification for an arrest or for a search. 
II THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS UNREASONABLE 
AS NOT HAVING BEEN BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE. 
19. The arguments in the appellant's brief are stated in a 
appropriate chronological order. The effect is that each 
unlawful act of law enforcement serves to taint the acts that 
follow and the fruit of those acts. Wong Sun v. United States/ 
371 U.S. 471 (1963)/ enunciates the doctrine of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree. The argument just made fits hand in glove with 
this argument. If this Court finds that any of the acts of law 
enforcement, to wit: The stop, the arrest, the search of the 
vehicle, the interrogation of the appellant/ or the search of the 
residence were unreasonable and in violation of the appellant's 
constitutional rights# all of the subsequent events are also 
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violations of the appellant's constitutional rights as having 
been induced by the prior violation. 
20. Whether law enforcement knew that none of the items 
purchased by the appellant were illegal or "regulated" or whether 
law enforcement was ignorant of that fact because of its failure 
to make a timely telephone call for the purpose to ascertain 
exactly what the appellant had purchased to include the legal 
status of what had been purchased are objective facts which fly 
in the face of the claim that the search was reasonable. The 
whole act of the law enforcement in this case is no more and 
nothing less than the bully's game of "the next guy out of the 
rest room." They were going to make a bust. 
21. The citations of authority in argument I apply to this 
argument as well. 
III. THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION OF THE APPELLANT 
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS A VIOLATION OF THE 
APPELLANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
22. The interrogation by law enforcement officers of the 
appellant following the unreasonable stop, the unreasonable 
arrest and the unreasonable search renders the information 
received from the appellant as being inadmissible and unavailable 
for use in the preparation of a search warrant. Wong Sun v. 
United States, supra. 
IV. THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S RESIDENCE WAS 
UNREASONABLE AS HAVING BEEN TAINTED AND HAS HAVING 
BEEN BASED UPON A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS SUPPORTED 
BY AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE 
23. The search of the appellant's residence, according to 
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the affidavit of the officer in support of the search warrant, 
cannot be categorized as anything but a fishing expedition. The 
affidavit entitled "Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of and 
Motion for a Search Warrant" (R-70 through 72) contains nothing 
from which a neutral and detached magistrate could conclude that 
the residence contained any evidence of the commission of a 
crime. Neither the custodial interrogation of the appellant nor 
of April Garza revealed anything except the address of the 
residence (R-71 paragraph 12). 
24. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit (R-70 through 
72) are 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
a) Paragraph 13 only verifies that the address given 
was accurate. 
b) Paragraph 14 constitutes an expression that the 
officer does not believe the appellant or April Garza. 
c) Paragraph 15 constitutes an expression of a belief 
based only on suspicion that the appellant and April Garza ". . . 
are or may be in possession of controlled substances. . ." 
Further beliefs are expressed. 
d) Paragraph 16 refers to evidence which is not 
contraband as being the basis to believe, along with the 
purported history of April Garza, that a "no knock" warrant be 
issued. 
25. Zinn v. State, 656 P.2d 1026 (Alaska App. 1982) stands 
for the sound proposition that: 
Of those several areas in which an 
individual's privacy receives protection by 
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the Fourth Amendment, in none is the zone of 
privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical 
dimensions of an individuals home; physical 
entry of a home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed. 
This residence was the appellant's home which he shared with 
April Garza. Both had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987) holds that ". . . a 
police officer's belief is irrelevant to the question of the 
defendant's expectation of privacy. The police officer, as the 
affiant, couches the firmness of his assertion with the word 
"believes," and further employs the phrase "or may be" to weaken 
his belief. He is asking for permission to go fishing. 
26. Nothing contained in either the affidavit or in the 
transcript of the hearing reveals any claim to a source, whether 
confidential or otherwise, which claims to have seen any 
contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct. It is 
important to acknowledge that the fruit of the search cannot be 
used to justify the search. Lucky guesses are not an acceptable 
substitute for probable cause. 
CONCLUSION 
27. The actions of law enforcement officers in stopping the 
appellant and arresting him were based upon a premature judgment 
that he had purchased items the possession of which constitutes a 
crime. The search of the appellant's vehicle resulted in the 
discovery of suspicious, but legal, items of property, but only 
the suspicion of the officers, without any other evidence, 
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converted that possession into criminal conduct* The 
interrogation of the appellant after the unlawful stop, arrest 
and search was unlawful. All of the above should have resulted 
in a suppression of the evidence seized from the appellant's 
automobile and from his home. 
28. The warrant authorizing the search of the appellant's 
home was not based upon probable cause, and the evidence obtained 
as a result thereof ought to have been suppressed by the trial 
court. 
29. The appellant urges that the only lawful ruling this 
Court can make is to reverse the ruling of the trial court on the 
motion to suppress evidence and either and remand the case to the 
trial court: 
a) With direction to enter a judgment of dismissal of 
the information against the appellant; or, 
b) With direction to enter a judgment granting the 
motion to suppress evidence and for further proceedings 
consistent therewith. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of February, 1991. 
Jay Fitt 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I certify that I have hand delivered a true and accurate 
copy of the above and foregoing this 25th day of April/ 1991/ to: 
R. Paul Van Dam/ Esq. 
Utah Attorney General 
Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 1 
And then would you want to r P Q ^ ^ 
j
 ^ respond to 
anything they might say that is in response to 
your — 
MS. RAGAN: I don't know yet, Judge. 
THE COURT: We'll give you five days 
to do that. 
MS. RAGAN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
We'll be in recess. I'll take the matter 
under advisement pending what we do in the future. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
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ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR1 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
o!*n 
"ST5 _ csptfy 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s , 
FOSTER LEONARD and APRIL GARZA, 
Defendants. 
Case Number 88-CR-0042 
88-CR-0043 
RULING 
******** 
This matter came before the Court on the August 29, 
1989 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the arrest of above entitled defendants, and the subsequent 
search of defendants1 vehicle and place of residence. Sherry 
Ragan appeared for the State. Both defendants were present and 
represented by counsel. Defendant Leonard was represented by Jay 
Fitt and defendant Garza was represented by Dean Zabriskie. 
Witnesses were called and evidence was presented. The Court, 
having carefully considered all the evidence enters now its: 
RULING 
From approximately May 1, 1989, law enforcement 
agencies had been conducting suveillance at Intertech Chemical in 
Orem Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a number of arrests 
and convictions. On July 20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was 
conducting surveillance at Intertech. He noticed defendant 
Leonard in the parking lot wearing casual clothes and using what 
appeared to be a personal vehicle rather than a company vehicle. 
Leonard behaved in a nervous manner. He purchased what looked to 
the detective to be glassware and chemicals and appeared to pay 
in cash. Defendants loaded the glassware and chemicals in to the 
vehicle and left the parking lot. 
Detective Fox decided to follow the vehicle in order to 
identify its owner. As Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, 
another car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent attempt to 
disrupt his progress. It appeared to Fox that the defendants' 
vehicle was trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless behavior 
on the part of the defendants as they turned to get on the 
freeway that nearly caused an accident. On the freeway, the 
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per hour in a 55 miles 
per hour zone. 
Detective Fox called for back up after a check through 
dispatch found no owner registered for either the plates of the 
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that swerved in front of 
him. The vehicle was stopped without incident after the backup 
arrived. The officers on the scene then arrested the defendants 
and gave the appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants were 
interviewed separately concerning what they had purchased and the 
purpose for which they had purchased it. They gave the officers 
different stories—but both indicated that they were purchasing 
the equipment for someone else. Defendant Leonard at first gave 
a false identification and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found 
in defendant Garza's purse. 
Prior to the arrest of the defendants and the search of 
the vehicle, the officers had made contact with Intertech and 
were told what the defendants had purchased. The items found in 
the vehicle—including glassware and chemicals—matched the 
description of the merchandise given by Intertech. The vehicle 
contained items frequently used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two different addresses as 
her own. After checking with Mountain Bell, the officers found 
that one of the addresses given had a phone listed in her name. 
Based upon the information given above, a search warrant was 
served on defendant Garza's residence. Numerous "listed" 
chemicals and drug paraphernalia were found. 
The Court finds that the stop made by the officers was 
appropriate and legal. Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion 
based on the circumstances taken as a whole. The defendants did 
not appear to be ordinary businessmen; they appeared to be 
nervous; they drove erratically; they used what appeared to be a 
personal vehicle; another car seemed to be acting in concert with 
defendants in an attempt to block the detective's pursuit; 
dispatch could not identify owner of the the vehicle from the 
license plate number; the defendants were traveling more than 15 
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit; the list of items 
purchased given to the officers while in pursuit were indicative 
of illegal activity. All of these factors taken together could 
easily create a reasonable and articulateble suspicion necessary 
to make an investigatory stop. 
Defendants were properly given their Miranda warnings. 
Even before the officers began investigatory questioning which 
does not require it, defendants were given Miranda warnings. 
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1983). 
The Court believes the search of the defendants' 
vehicle was proper. The list of items purchased from Intertech 
received while the officers were in pursuit, combined with the 
suspicious behavior of the defendants, and all attendant 
circumstances, created probable cause for search of the vehicle. 
Even if the search was improper, the illegality would not affect 
the legality of the search warrant. The reasoning of the Court 
is that information relative to the evidence found in the vehicle 
was available to the officers in the form of a purchase order 
from Intertech. 
The chemicals and equipment found in the defendants' 
vehicle and on the purchase order from Intertech were commonly 
used together in the making of methamphetamine. In fact 
testimony indicated that the materials found lacked only one 
specialized piece of glassware and some other chemicals to allow 
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also, such equipment is 
rarely used in conjunction to make anything other than 
methamphetamine. The officers, being aware of the facts above, 
had probable cause to make the arrest. 
The Court believes that there was sufficient probable 
cause for the issuance of the search warrant based on the conduct 
of the defendants and the purchase order from Intertech. This 
probable cause v*as enhanced by the statements of the defendants 
relative to the intended use of the supplies obtained from 
Inteftech and the false information given relative to living 
quarters and identity. 
For the reasons given above, the Court finds that the 
stop of the defendants' vehicle, the subsequent questioning of 
the defendants, and the issuance of the search warrant were 
proper. Therefore, the Court denies defendants motion to 
suppress. 
DATED in Provo, this /f>^day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE BT BALLIF, JUDG 
cc: Dean Zabriskie 
Jay Fitt 
Sherry Ragan 
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MR. FITT: Objection 
THE COURT: Overrul 
THE WITNESS: As he 
his cigarette. 
I saw a female employee 
previous 
They 
isiness, 
on that 
were driv-
I noticed 
businessmen, mean-
business 
Ik to th 
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e doorway, 
a cigarette, keep 
scanning the park-
Conclusion. 
ed. He1 
scanned 
inside 
ly known to me by the name 
s describ-
around, he 
the busi-
of "Gigi," 
ew worked there — set out cartons or contain-
These cartons or containers had pictures 
_ j 
on them in blue and black consistent with glassware 
boxes. They had pictures of flasks on them. 
I saw her set out gallon containers, some 
type of chemical. I couldn't tell what it was at that 
time. 
And then I saw Mr. Leonard continue to come 
to the doorway, look around. 
He lifted up his — 
Q (By Ms. Ragan) Did you have anything to aid 
your viewing? 
A Yes. I had a pair of seven times 50 bino-
culars that I was viewing through at approximately a 
distance of three or 400 feet away. I had pretty good 
vision. 
Q Go ahead. 
After you saw Gigi take the boxes out — 
A Mr. Leonard continued to do what appeared 
to be surveillance. 
He lifted up his front shirt and appeared 
to be doing something down the front of his pants 
here, and then looked like to me he took a wallet from 
his pants — 
MR. FITT: Your Honor, that's — that 
sounds like a conclusion. I would ask — 
THE COURT: I think it is. 
11. 
I will disregard what he thought it might 
have been. But describe what you saw someone do, and 
what he may have had rather than what you thought he 
might — 
THE WITNESS: It looked like he took 
something out of the front of his pants. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: As he looked around, 
pretty soon these chemicals were loaded by the front 
doorway by the employee of Intertech. 
Mr. Leonard came out and got into this 
Bronco and drove it over by the front door. And he 
and Miss Garza loaded these chemicals into the back of 
the Bronco. 
I could see that the boxes were the same 
size and shape as other cases that we have worked — 
past experience — that they were glassware. 
The chemical bottles are distinctive, in 
that they're a white plastic with a screw-on lid in 
gallon size containers. We have taken down many type 
of solids — chemical solids — from these labs in 
these type of bottles. 
These were all put into the back of this 
Bronco. 
They both got into the Bronco and proceeded 
12. 
to leave the business. 
Q (By Ms. Ragan) Okay. 
What happened after they --
Who was driving? 
A Mr. Leonard was driving. 
Q Okay. 
What did you do then after they started to 
leave? 
A As they pulled out, I was going to try and 
get a plate number to find out who they were, follow 
them out. Contact — 
Usually in the past what we've done is con-
tacted the business to see what type of glassware and 
chemicals they've picked up. And that was the purpose 
for following them. 
As we pulled out of Intertech and headed 
north on the peripheral roads — it's kind of a curved 
road — there was a white, cream-colored Datsun. And 
it was parked against traffic on the wrong side of the 
road. 
And as the Bronco passed, this Datsun that 
was parked facing Intertech made a U-turn and cut me 
off. I had to brake to avoid an accident there. 
It got right behind the Bronco as they 
headed out to the stop sign on the peripheral road on 
13. 
Center Street, 
They then made a right turn to go up Cen-
ter Street towards the light at the 1-15 on ramp for 
northbound traffic. 
Q Now, this is the defendants1 vehicle or 
the — 
A Yeah. The Bronco. 
And then right behind it was this small, 
cream-colored vehicle, and then myself. 
And we got up to the on ramp where you 
have to make a left turn to go northbound. There was 
a small four-door red vehicle that was making a right-
hand turn that had the right of way to go onto the on 
ramp. 
The Bronco, being driven by Mr. Leonard, 
made a left turn failing to yield the right of way in 
front of this red vehicle, forcing the red vehicle off 
of the travel portion of the roadway off onto 
towards the barrow pit. 
At the same time the cream-colored vehicle 
slammed on its brakes in front of me and made an S-weave 
as if trying to keep me following the vehicle — 
MR. FITT: Objection, Your Honor. 
Conclusion. 
THE COURT: That is a conclusion. 
14. 
Describe what you saw. 
THE WITNESS: It swerved in front of 
me and slammed on its brakes. 
I went around the cream-colored vehicle and 
went after the Bronco that failed to yield the right of 
way. Almost caused that accident. And we went onto 
the on ramp. 
Immediately when we got onto the on ramp 
and started heading north on 1-15, the Bronco accel-
erated very rapidly to about 72 miles an hour as I 
paced it with my vehicle. 
I thought, "Well, Ifm going to run a regis-
tration check on the vehicle." I ran a registration 
check on this vehicle through dispatch. 
Dispatch came back and said that the plates 
on the vehicle were not on file, which concerned 
me. 
Q (By Ms. Ragan) Did you run a registration 
check on the cream-colored vehicle? 
A Yes, I did, and it was not on file 
either. 
Q Okay. 
A After turning on the on ramp I called both 
these plate numbers into dispatch and asked for 
those. 
15. 
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1 We accelerated about 72 miles an hour — 
2 excuse me — we were in the inside lane traveling up 
3 1-15. 
4 I called for Terry Taylor, who is an officer 
5
 I from Orem City Police Department, asked him if he could 
back me up on a traffic stop, because I was going to 
stop this vehicle for the traffic violations I had 
8
 | observed. He was not readily available. 
I continued to call dispatch to see if I 
could get some help. 
She cleared the air to see if she could get 
a unit to back me up. 
As we headed northbound on 1-15 the vehicle 
made a lane change from the inside lane to one of the 
middle lanes in the freeway without signaling. We con-
tinued over 70 miles an hour this whole distance. 
Q What is the speed limit? 
A It's 55 miles per hour at that time through 
there. 
Prior to getting to the northbound rest 
areas Ms. Garza and Mr. Leonard put flags out the side 
of the Bronco. They were bandana-type. One was blue 
and one was red. And they were sticking out the 
windows, flapping in the breeze. 
And I became fearful then. I felt that 
16. 
1 because of past experience, the people that we had 
2 dealt with were felons — 
3 MR. FITT: Objection, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: I'll allow him to give 
5 feeling relative — as foundation for some action he's 
6 I going to take. 
? I take it you're going to explain some-
8 thing? 
9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
11
 THE WITNESS: Because the past people 
12
 we have dealt with have been felons, had exten-
13
 I sive criminal histories — some of them for homicide 
— have been escapees from prison and were armed in 
15
 | these type of stops, I was concerned for ij safety. I 
wanted to make sure I had sufficient backup to make a 
stop on this vehicle* 
The flags coming out the side windows was 
very unique, strange to me, and it kind of frightened 
me. So I continued to call for backup and assis-
tance. 
As we went past the southbound rest areas I 
saw in my rear view mirror again this cream-colored 
vehicle. And I felt it was a chase car, an assis-
tance car. And I was again fearful that I needed to 
14 
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17. 
have enough help to stop this vehicle so I wouldn't 
get hart. 
Just after I passed the northbound rest 
areas — approximately half a mile — Detective Sergeant 
Caldwell and Sergeant Blackhurst from Pleasant Grove 
were riding in the same car, caught up to me to assist 
me. 
There was also Sean Greening, an officer 
from our city. He got behind us and was also 
involved. 
Once we all got behind this vehicle, the 
vehicle made another lane change from the center 
lane to the inside lane, again failing to signal. 
Never did decrease his speed below the 70 miles per 
hour. 
We decided to make a traffic stop. Initi-
ated the traffic stop and got the vehicle stopped on 
the north side of Lehi on 1-15 northbound. 
Q (By Ms. Ragan) What position was your 
vehicle in at this time? 
A Vehicle initiating the stop would have been 
Mike Blackhurst and Detective Caldwell. The second 
vehicle was Sean Greening, the officer who assisted 
me. And I was the third vehicle back. 
Q Okay. 
18. 
What happened, then, after the vehicle 
stopped? 
A We made a stop. I went to the front car 
with Sergeant Caldwell and Blackhurst. 
Mr. Leonard got out of the vehicle, started 
walking back towards us. 
Fearing for the safety of what I had seen 
his actions and seen him do, I had him kneel down so 
I could watch his hands and he wouldn't flee from 
me. 
And I then had Ms. Garza get out of the 
vehicle, come back and kneel down — we were off in the 
emergency lane — the same type. 
At that time Sergeant Caldwell took over. 
He went and got Mr. Leonard, took him off to the side 
of the road. I heard him advise him of his rights 
per Miranda. 
He then started asking him what they were 
doing. 
As I walked up to the Bronco at that point, 
in plain view looking in the back, I saw these boxes. 
They were marked as "flask." One of the boxes tops was 
open. You could see the gallon containers and glass 
flasks of chemical, all in plain view sitting in the 
back. 
19. 
ADDENDUM 4 
A That's right. 
Q Now, you commented on the fact that he had 
what you described as something in the front of his 
pants. 
Did he use that to pay for — were you able 
to observe what he was doing? 
A I couldn't see. 
Q Okay. 
At that juncture, based on what he had pur-
chased and the way he looked, had you determined that 
you were going to arrest him? 
A No. 
I wanted to find out from his registration 
who he was, and call in the business as we had done in 
the past and find out what he picked up. That was 
my — that's why I followed him. 
Q So are you telling me you didn't know 
what he had picked up? 
A No. 
I saw the glassware, and I knew he picked 
up a chemical. I couldn't read on the bottle what type 
of chemical it was. 
As you should be aware, there are some 
types of chemicals that are regulated. If he had of 
picked up a regulated chemical, it would have been ille-
32. 
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didn't know at that time. | 
But that's what I'm trying to point 
At that time you didn't know what he I 
That's correct. 
Okay. 
And would it be your conduct thereafter to j 
from the business what had been purchased? 
the 
Yeah. 
And why didn't you do that? 
That call was made. 
To the business? 
Yes. 
What ~ 
That was made by Sergeant Caldwell. 
Do you know when it was made? 
I think it was made sometime after we 
rest areas and 1-15 and West Main, American 
Somewhere in that area. 
Q 
A 
Q 
at the 
You were in pursuit at the juncture; were you 
Yes. 
In fact, there were many officers in pur-
juncture? 
33. 
1 A There was three vehicles. 
2 Q Okay. 
3 So you had not made the call to the busi-
4 ness to confirm what was in the car? 
5 A No, I did not. Sergeant Caldwell made that 
6 call. 
7 Q Okay. Is this — 
8 In these particular exhibits, that's all 
9 they had in the back of their car. Do you recall? 
10 A No. I think there was some other items. 
11 Q Excuse me. 
12 A I think there were some other items. 
13 I didn't inventory it. I think some type 
14 of long stir stick. And there was the plastic white 
15 bottles. I testified about, the gallon size con-
16 I tainer with a screw-on lid. They're not pictured 
there. (Indicating.) 
18 | Q Okay. 
19
 I Were you able to determine later whether, 
20
 I in fact, anything they purchased was illegal? 
21
 | A Yes. 
Q What was illegal? 
A Nothing that they purchased was illegal 
or regulated. 
Q So what they had in their car at that time 
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34. 
was considered — what would you call it; legal con-
traband or a legal purchase? 
A It was a legal purchase, 
Q Okay. 
You determined to follow them. Why? 
A Because of his behavior. Because I wanted 
to find out if what they had in there was a regulated 
chemical. 
Once I started following them and there 
were numerous traffic violations that bordered on 
reckless driving, I was going to stop him. 
Q So up until the traffic violations you had 
not resolved in your own mind that you were going to 
stop him? 
A That's right. 
Q What were you looking for when you were 
following them? 
A I was trying to get the registration off the 
vehicle to find out who it belonged to, which showed 
that the plates were not on file. So I had no idea who 
the person was, whether they were correct plates on the 
vehicle, whether they were wrong plates on the 
vehicle. I did not know. 
Q So at that juncture had you determined to 
stop the car? 
35. 
ADDENDUM 5 
1 A I would say itfs probably pretty close. 
2 Q You — who called the owner of Intertech 
3 Trading to find out what had been sold? 
4 A I did. 
5 Q Did you ask her whether there were any 
6
 regulated items among the items sold? 
7
 A I did. 
8 Q And she told you "no"; is that correct? 
9
 I A That1s correct. 
Q Now, she can legally sell that, can't she, 
all these items? 
A They do legitimate business every day, I'm 
sure. 
Q Selling the same items? 
15
 I A Yes. 
Q Now, you say that Officer Fox saw the glass-
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ware. 
In fact, he only saw the boxes; is that 
true? 
A That correct. 
Q And you do sell these — this contraband 
back to the — back to Intertech from time to time for 
resale to the public? 
A We sell the chemicals back to them, because 
it's against the law for us to hang onto them. 
96. 
ADDENDUM 6 
CIRCUIT CQORT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
UTAH C0U1ITY, STATE OF UTAH 
************************************************************* 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AND MOTION FOR A 
SEARCH WARRANT 
CASE NO. 
****************************** *******^*V******************** 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
1. Gary Caldwell
 f being first duly sworn on 
oathf deposes and says; 
2. That I am a police officer for American Fork Police 
Department, American Fork, Utah, Utah County, State 
of Ut;.h. 
3. That I have been a police officer for the past ten years. 
I have been working with a narcotics task force as a 
supervisor for the past two years. I have experience in 
serving as many as 100 search warrants during the past eight 
years. I have arrested many people for narcotics violations 
firing the same period of time 
4. I have been to narcotics tr'aining classes during the past 
two years to train me in working with different types of 
narcotics cases. One of the classes dealt with methamphetimines 
and how people operate labs. I have been trained in all 
aspects of the operation of and the way people operate in 
order to set a lab up. 
5. In the past three months I have had experience in arresting 
as many as twelve persons who have been involved in manufacturing 
methamphetimine labs. I have found and located meth labs 
in houses and vehicles. I have seen the equipment used and 
the method of operation. 
6. On July 20th, 1989 at 1400 hours, Lt. Fox of the American 
Fork Police Department observed a blue 1980 Bronco with Utah 
Plates # 023 DAD pick up items from Intertech Trading in 
Orem, Utah at 170 South Mtn. Way Dr. The itmes he could see 
being loaded appeared to be paraphrenlia items used in a 
methamphetimine lab. Lt. Fox contacted your affiant at the 
American Fork Police Dept. and told me what he had seen. He 
was asked to follow the vehicle until I could determine who 
the person picking the itmes up was. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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I was able to determine that the items picked up were items 
listed on the House Bill # 3 as paraphrenlia items. I believe 
that based on the actions of the two suspects in the vehicle 
and the items purchased by cash from Intertech Trading that 
the two persons knew that the items were going or were probably 
going to a meth lab. 
The actions were that the two suspects hid the itmes in the 
rear of the vehicle they were driving. They did not gixre any 
names at the time of purchase. They picked up items listed 
on House Bill #3 and other items we believe are used to manu 
facture meth. They had some one other than the registered 
owner drive the vehicle. 
At approximately 1400 hours, your affiant stopped the suspect 
vehicle and advised the driver of his rights. He told your affiar 
that he was paid to come to Orem by a man he knows as "Fatso" 
and pick up the paraphrenlia items. He told me that he 
was to take the items to Salt Lake Cith to a motel, rent a 
room and call the guy at a pay phone booth and he would come 
pick up the chemicals and glass ware, he told me that he was 
given $540.00 cash to pay for the items. 
Your affiant interviewed the female suspect at the American 
Fork Police Department and she told your affiant that she 
met a man in a business in Salt Lake City two months ago. 
She told me that the man she knows as Mike Shriver is 
from California and he gave-her $2,000.00 in cash to go to 
Orem to pick the chemicals and paraphrenlia items up. She 
said jhey were to take the items to Salt Lake to a Motel 
and rent it for three days and put the key on top of the 
pay phone outside.The suspect was to call her at her house 
and she would tell him where the key was and he would pick 
the items up. 
Your affiant believes that there is probable cause to believe 
that both suspects were in possession of drug paraphrenlia 
with intent to manufacture Methamphetamines. Your affiant 
ran a criminal history on April Garza and found that 
she has been in prison in California and possible Oregon. I 
found that,she had family in Oregon. I learned that she has 
been arrested for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamines 
Conspracy to Dist. and Poss Methamphetamines . She also 
has a arrest for assault on a police officer with a firearm. 
Your affiant interviewed April and Leonard, the two suspects 
and both of them gave your affiant an address in Salt Lake 
City. April gave your affiant this address also and said she 
lived here too. I asked her which address she really lived at 
and she gave me the 5600 South 1291 East #6. I was able to 
have her give me her phone number. She stated the number was 
the number registered to the stated address. I called Mary 
at Mtn. Bell and she told me that the phone number given to 
your affiant was registered to April at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6 in Murray.Utah 
13. Your affiant sent Det. Blackhurst and Det. Taylor from Orem 
Police to Murray to the stated address, and they located 
a 280 Z car which is registered to April. The car is parked 
right in front of the stated residence. Your affiant was 
told by Blackhurst that the mail box in front ofthe residence 
had the name of April and Leonard on it. 
14. Your affiant believes that the two listed suspects have not 
been honest with me and that they in fact may the ones 
making or manufacturing or distributing methamphetamines. That 
they in fact live at the stated address at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6. 
15. Your affiant believes that the two suspects are or may be 
in possession of controlled substances in the residence which 
have been manufactured by glass ware and items the same as 
we seized. Your affiant believes that the two suspects will 
be in possession of items used to distribute or manufacture 
controlled substances, and that they will be in possession 
of items used to identify them and their sources for the 
sale or distribution of controlled substances. 
16. Your affiant believes that because of the evidence found 
already and the criminal history of April and because of 
the type of items involved in the use and manufacturing of 
methamphetimines that there is a serious danger to the officers 
serving the search warrant. April is not in the house, but 
in the Utah County Jail, however, anyone could be in the stated 
residence. 
17. Therefore, Your affiant respectfully request a warrant to 
search the stated residence and to enter the residence without 
first giving notice of our presence and intent to enter. 
Jy-u^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 2-c? DAY OF JULY 1 9 8 9 . 
TIME: iS'-W 
CIRCUIT J50URT JUDGE 
